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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 10-3302 
 ___________ 
 
 SAMSON B. SLEWION,  
 
  Appellant 
        
 v. 
 
MATTHEW P. VENEMA;  
JEANNE M. PROKO;  
GEORGE B. KEAHEY   
____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Civil Action No. 2-10-cv-03276) 
 District Judge:  Honorable J. Curtis Joyner 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 15, 2011 
 
 Before:  RENDELL, CHAGARES and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges 
 







 Samson B. Slewion filed a pro se complaint in the District Court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania alleging that he was assaulted in 2004 and seriously injured, that 
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he filed a personal injury action in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, and 
that an arbitration panel entered an award in his favor.  Slewion appealed the award, and 
the Court of Common Pleas established a discovery deadline of April 6, 2009.  The 
lawyers representing the defendants in state court, Matthew P. Venema, Jeanne M. Proko, 
and George B. Keahey, allegedly moved to compel discovery after expiration of the 
deadline, and the trial court denied the motion.  Slewion alleges that Venema, Proko, and 
Keahey then “falsified a material fact by trick … by forging the discovery deadline of the 
case management order from April 6, 2009, to May 7, 2009.”  Compl. at 4.  Slewion 
claims that he “was precluded from testifying about liability and damages” as a result.  
Id.  Naming Venema, Proko, and Keahey as defendants in this federal suit, Slewion 
sought compensatory damages for the injuries he allegedly suffered in the 2004 assault. 
 The District Court granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis and dismissed the 
complaint as legally frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).  The court explained 
that Slewion appears to seek relief because he is dissatisfied with the outcome of the state 
court case, but that a federal district court lacks jurisdiction to a review a state court 
judgment by virtue of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.  Slewion timely filed this appeal.  
 We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review is plenary.  
See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).   
 This Court recently affirmed the dismissal of a similar suit by Slewion in which he 
named the Court of Common Pleas as the defendant, and our analysis of the jurisdictional 
issue in that case applies equally here: 
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To the extent that Slewion is challenging the judgment or 
decisions of the Court of Common Pleas, the District Court 
lacked jurisdiction over the matter.  The Rooker-Feldman 
doctrine deprives a District Court  of jurisdiction to review, 
directly or indirectly, a state court adjudication.  See D.C. 
Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. 
Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923).  The Supreme Court 
has explained that this doctrine is narrow and confined to 
cases “brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries 
caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district 
court proceedings commenced and inviting district court 
review and rejection of those judgments.”  Exxon Mobil 
Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). 
Thus, to the extent that Slewion sought to have the District 
Court invalidate the orders of the Court of Common Pleas, it 
lacked jurisdiction to do so. 
 
Slewion v. Court of Common Pleas Phila. County, No. 10-3767, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 
25040, at *2-3 (3d Cir. Dec. 7, 2010) (per curiam) (not precedential). 
 Slewion contends on appeal that he filed this suit against Venema, Proko, and 
Keahey based on “three distinct federal offenses” under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 for allegedly 
falsifying the state court’s case management order.  Appellant’s Br. at 3-4.  Slewion does 
not, however, have a private cause of action against defendants under 18 U.S.C. § 1001, a 
criminal statute.  See Andrews v. Heaton, 483 F.3d 1070, 1076 (10th Cir. 2007).  Further, 
as we explained in the prior suit, “[t]here is no federal right to require the government to 
initiate criminal proceedings.”  Slewion, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 25040 at *3. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment dismissing 
the complaint as legally frivolous.  
